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In theory, democracy is a bulwark against
socially harmful policies. In practice, however,
democracies frequently adopt and maintain poli-
cies that are damaging. How can this paradox be
explained?
The influence of special interests and voter
ignorance are two leading explanations. I offer
an alternative story of how and why democracy
fails. The central idea is that voters are worse
than ignorant; they are, in a word, irrational—and
they vote accordingly. Despite their lack of
knowledge, voters are not humble agnostics;
instead, they confidently embrace a long list of
misconceptions. 
Economic policy is the primary activity of the
modern state. And if there is one thing that the
public deeply misunderstands, it is economics.
People do not grasp the “invisible hand” of the
market, with its ability to harmonize private
greed and the public interest. I call this anti-mar-
ket bias. They underestimate the benefits of
interaction with foreigners. I call this anti-foreign
bias. They equate prosperity not with produc-
tion, but with employment. I call this make-work
bias. Finally, they are overly prone to think that
economic conditions are bad and getting worse.
I call this pessimistic bias. 
In the minds of many, Winston Churchill’s
famous aphorism cuts the conversation short:
“Democracy is the worst form of government,
except all those other forms that have been tried
from time to time.” But this saying overlooks the
fact that governments vary in scope as well as
form. In democracies the main alternative to
majority rule is not dictatorship, but markets. A
better understanding of voter irrationality advis-
es us to rely less on democracy and more on the
market.
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Introduction: The Paradox
of Democracy
In a dictatorship, government policy is often
appalling but rarely baffling. The building of
the Berlin Wall sparked worldwide outcry, but
few wondered, “what are the leaders of East
Germany thinking?” That was obvious: they
wanted to continue ruling over their subjects,
who were inconsiderately fleeing en masse.
No wonder democracy is such a popular
political panacea. The history of dictator-
ships creates a strong impression that bad
policies exist because the interests of rulers
and ruled diverge. A simple solution is make
the rulers and the ruled identical by giving
“power to the people.” If the people decide to
delegate decisions to full-time politicians, so
what? Those who pay the piper—or vote to
pay the piper—call the tune.
This optimistic story is, however, often at
odds with the facts. Democracies frequently
adopt and maintain policies harmful for most
people.1 Protectionism is a classic example.
Economists across the political spectrum have
pointed out its folly for centuries, but almost
every democracy restricts imports. Admittedly,
this is less appalling than the Berlin Wall, yet it
is more baffling. In theory, democracy is a bul-
wark against socially harmful policies, but in
practice it gives them a safe harbor. 
How can this paradox be explained? One
answer is that the people’s “representatives”
have turned the tables on them.2 Elections
might be a weaker deterrent to misconduct
than they seem on the surface, making it more
important to please special interests than the
general public. A second answer, which com-
plements the first, is that voters are deeply
ignorant about politics.3 They do not know
who their representatives are, much less what
they do. This tempts politicians to pursue per-
sonal agendas and sell themselves to donors.
I offer an alternative story of how democ-
racy fails. The central idea is that voters are
worse than ignorant; they are, in a word, irra-
tional—and vote accordingly. Despite their
lack of knowledge, voters are not humble
agnostics; instead, they confidently embrace
a long list of misconceptions. 
When cataloging the failures of democra-
cy, one must keep things in perspective. The
shortcomings of democracy pale in compari-
son with those of totalitarian regimes.
Democracies do not murder millions of their
own citizens. Fair enough, but such compar-
isons set the bar too low. Now that democra-
cy is the most common form of government,
there is little reason to dwell on the truism
that it is “better than communism.” It is now
more worthwhile to figure out how and why
democracy falls short.
In the minds of many, one of Winston
Churchill’s most famous aphorisms cuts the
conversation short: “Democracy is the worst
form of government, except all those other
forms that have been tried from time to
time.”4 But this saying overlooks the fact that
governments vary in scope as well as form. In
democracies the main alternative to majority
rule is not dictatorship, but markets. 
Economists have an undeserved reputa-
tion for “religious faith” in markets. No one
has done more than economists to dissect
the innumerable ways that markets can fail.
After all their investigations, though, econo-
mists typically conclude that the man in the
street—and the intellectual without econom-
ic training—underestimates how well mar-
kets work. I maintain that something quite
different holds for democracy: it is widely
overrated not only by the public but by most
economists, too. Thus, while the general pub-
lic underestimates how well markets work,
even economists underestimate markets’
virtues relative to the democratic alternative.
Is the “Miracle of 
Aggregation” Just Wishful
Thinking?
What voters don’t know would fill a uni-
versity library. In the last few decades, econo-
mists who study politics have thrown fuel on
the fire by pointing out that—selfishly speak-
ing—voters are not making a mistake. One
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vote has so small a probability of affecting
electoral outcomes that a realistic egoist pays
no attention to politics; he chooses to be, in
economic jargon, rationally ignorant.
The vast empirical literature on voter
knowledge bears this out.5 Almost all econo-
mists and political scientists now accept that
the average citizen’s level of political knowl-
edge is extraordinarily low. At the same time,
however, scholars have also largely come to
believe that this doesn’t really matter, because
democracy can function well under almost
any magnitude of voter ignorance.6
How is this possible? Assume that voters
do not make systematic errors. Though they
err constantly, their errors are random.7 If
voters face a blind choice between X and Y,
knowing nothing about them, they are equal-
ly likely to choose either. 
With 100 percent voter ignorance, matters
are predictably grim. One candidate could be
the Unabomber, plotting to shut down civiliza-
tion. If voters choose randomly, the Unabomber
wins half the time. True, the assumption of zero
voter knowledge is overly pessimistic; informed
voters are rare, but they do exist. But this seems
a small consolation. One hundred percent igno-
rance leads to disaster. Can 99 percent ignorance
be significantly better? 
Yes. Democracy with 99 percent ignorance
looks a lot more like democracy with full
information than democracy with total igno-
rance. Why? First, imagine an electorate
where 100 percent of all voters are well-
informed. Who wins the election? Trivially,
whoever has the support of a majority of the well-
informed. Next, switch to the case where only
1 percent of voters are well-informed. The
other 99 percent are so thick that they vote at
random. Quiz a person waiting to vote, and
you are almost sure to conclude, with alarm,
that he has no idea what he is doing.
Nevertheless, it is basic statistics that—in a
large electorate—each candidate gets about
half of the random votes. Both candidates
can bank on roughly a 49.5 percent share. Yet
that is not enough to win. For that, they
must focus all their energies on the one well-
informed person in a hundred. Who takes
the prize? Whoever has the support of a majority of
the well-informed.
This result has been aptly named the “mira-
cle of aggregation.”8 It reads like an alchemist’s
recipe: mix 99 parts folly with 1 part wisdom to
get a compound as good as unadulterated wis-
dom. An almost completely ignorant electorate
makes the same decision as a fully informed
electorate—lead into gold, indeed! 
It is tempting to call this “voodoo poli-
tics,” or quip, as H. L. Mencken did, that
“democracy is a pathetic belief in the collec-
tive wisdom of individual ignorance.” But
there is nothing magical or pathetic about it.
James Surowiecki documents many instances
where the miracle of aggregation—or some-
thing akin to it—works as advertised.9 In a
contest to guess the weight of an ox, the average
of 787 guesses was off by a single pound. On
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, the answer most
popular with studio audiences was correct 91
percent of the time. Financial markets—
which aggregate the guesses of large num-
bers of people—often predict events better
than leading experts. Betting odds are excel-
lent predictors of the outcomes of everything
from sporting events to elections. In each
case, the logic enunciated by political scien-
tists Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro
applies:
This is just an example of the law of
large numbers. Under the right condi-
tions, individual measurement errors
will be independently random and will
tend to cancel each other out. Errors in
one direction will tend to offset errors
in the opposite direction.10
Judging from research in recent decades,
most economists find this logic compelling.
Almost all “respectable” modern economic
theories of politics begin by assuming that
the typical citizen understands economics
and votes accordingly—at least on average.11
Nor is this view limited to apologists for the
status quo. Some of the sternest critics of
government regulation nevertheless scoff at
the assumption of systematic voter bias.
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Legendary Chicago economist George Stigler
is a case in point:
The assumption that public policy has
often been inefficient because it was
based on mistaken views has little to
commend it. To believe, year after year,
decade after decade, that the protective
tariffs or usury laws to be found in
most lands are due to confusion rather
than purposeful action is singularly
obfuscatory.12
The bottom line is that if the miracle of aggre-
gation is true, then democracy can work, even
with a morbidly ignorant electorate. Demo-
cracy gives equal say to the wise and the not-
so-wise, but the wise determine policy.
Belaboring the electorate’s lack of knowledge
with study after study is beside the point.
But there is another kind of empirical evi-
dence that can discredit the miracle of aggre-
gation. The “miracle” only works if voters do
not make systematic errors. This suggests that
instead of rehashing the whole topic of voter
error, we concentrate our fire on the critical
and relatively unexplored question: Are voter
errors systematic?13
There are good reasons to suspect so. Our
average guess about the weight of oxen is
dead on. But cognitive psychology catalogs a
long list of other questions where our average
guess is systematically mistaken.14 That body
of research ought to open our minds to the
possibility of systematic voter error.
By itself, though, the psychological litera-
ture does not get us very far. The link
between general cognition and particular
political decisions is too loose. Voters might
be bad statisticians but perceptive judges of
wise policy. Thus, we should refine our ques-
tion: Are voter errors systematic on questions of
direct political relevance?
My answer is an emphatic yes. Economic
policy is the primary activity of the modern
state, making voter beliefs about economics
among the most—if not the most—politically
relevant beliefs. And if there is one thing that
the public deeply misunderstands, it is eco-
nomics.15 People do not grasp the “invisible
hand” of the market and its ability to harmo-
nize private greed and the public interest. I call
this anti-market bias. They underestimate the
benefits of interaction with foreigners. I call
this anti-foreign bias. They equate prosperity
not with production, but with employment. I
call this make-work bias. Lastly, they are overly
prone to think that economic conditions are
bad and getting worse. I call this pessimistic bias. 
If voters base their policy preferences on
deeply mistaken models of the economy, gov-
ernment is likely to perform its bread and but-
ter function poorly. To see this, suppose that
two candidates compete by taking positions
on the degree of protectionism they favor.
Random voter errors about the effect of protec-
tion cause some voters who prefer the effect of
free trade to vote for protection. But it is equal-
ly common for voters who prefer the effect of
protection to vote for free trade (see Figure
1).16 Then the miracle of aggregation holds: in
spite of voter ignorance, the winning platform
is socially optimal.
For anyone who has taught international
economics, though, this conclusion is under-
whelming. It takes hours of patient instruc-
tion to show students the light of compara-
tive advantage. After the final exam, there is a
distressing rate of recidivism. Suppose we
adopt the more realistic assumption that vot-
ers systematically overestimate the benefits
of protection. What happens? Lots of people
vote for protection who prefer the effect of
free trade, but only a few vote for free trade
who prefer the effect of protection (see
Figure 2). The political scales tilt out of bal-
ance; the winning platform is too protection-
ist. The median voter would be better off if he
received less protection than he asked for. But com-
petition impels politicians to heed what vot-
ers ask for, not what is best for them.
Comparable biases plausibly underlie policy
after policy. For example, the law of supply and
demand says that above-market prices create
unsaleable surpluses, but that has not stopped
most of Europe from regulating labor markets
into decades of depression-level unemploy-
ment.17 The most credible explanation is that
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the average voter sees no link between artificial-
ly high wages and unemployment. Before I
studied economics, I failed to see it myself. 
Systematically Biased
Beliefs about Economics
Economists have been complaining about
anti-market, anti-foreign, make-work, and
pessimistic biases for centuries. But what
exactly have economists been criticizing?
Where does the public go wrong? How preva-
lent are these biases? And if experts and the
public deeply disagree, what reason is there
to side with the experts, anyway? Perhaps it is
the experts who are biased.
I draw on several different bodies of evidence
to answer those questions. To pin down what
economists have been criticizing, I provide
some historic examples. To explain where the
public goes wrong, I summarize the main argu-
ments that economists have made in the past
and that textbooks still make today. To esti-
mate the prevalence of these biases, I rely on a
large body of surveys from recent decades.
But what about the hardest objection of
all? Isn’t it possible that the bias lies in the
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Figure 1
The Median Voter Model: Random Error
Figure 2
The Median Voter Model: Systematic Error
experts, rather than the public? If one finds
the economists of the past and the textbooks
of the present convincing, this question
becomes less interesting. But the critics of the
economics profession do make some disturb-
ing accusations about the field’s objectivity. 
The most common doubt about econo-
mists stems from their apparent inability to
agree, bestcaptured by George Bernard
Shaw’s line that “if all economists were laid
end to end, they would not reach a conclu-
sion.”18 But economists’ hard-core detractors
recognize the superficiality of this complaint.
They know that economists regularly see eye-
to-eye with one another. A quip from Steven
Kelman directly contradicts Shaw:
The near-unanimity of the answers
economists give to public policy ques-
tions, highly controversial among the
run of intelligent observers, but which
share the characteristic of being able to
be analyzed in terms of microeconomic
theory, reminds one of the unanimity
characterizing bodies such as the polit-
buro of the Soviet Communist Party.19
It is not lack of consensus that incenses
knowledgeable critics, but the way econo-
mists unite behind unpalatable conclusions,
such as doubts about the benefits of regula-
tion. Kelman bemoans the fact that even
economists in the Carter administration
were economists first and liberals second:
At the government agency where I have
worked and where agency lawyers and
agency microeconomists interact with
each other . . . the lawyers are often
exasperated, not only by the frequency
with which agency economists attack
their proposals but also by the una-
nimity among the agency economists
in their opposition. The lawyers tend
to (incorrectly) attribute this opposi-
tion to failure to hire “a broad enough
spectrum” of economists, and to beg
the economists, if they can’t support
the lawyers’ proposals, at least to give
them “the best economic arguments”
in favor of them. . . . The economists’
answer is typically something like,
“There are no good economic argu-
ments for your proposal.”20
Unsurprisingly, critics rarely change their
minds once they notice how regularly econo-
mists agree. Instead, they typically shift to the
argument that the experts are biased. Biased
how? There are two prominent stories. The
first is that economists suffer from “self-serv-
ing bias.” Economists are unusually affluent,
tenured, white, and male, and supposedly
confuse what is good for them with what is
good for the country. The second is that
economists suffer from right-wing “ideologi-
cal bias.” They use economics to give scientif-
ic respectability to their political prejudices.
Fortunately, there is one excellent data set
that allows us to bring these accusations to trial:
the Survey of Americans and Economists on
the Economy (henceforth SAEE).21 This unique
study, conducted by the Washington Post, Kaiser
Family Foundation, and Harvard University
Survey Project, asked 1,510 members of the
general public and 250 PhD economists the
same diverse set of questions about how the
economy works. The SAEE strongly supports
the view that economists and the public sharply
disagree in predictable ways. More importantly,
though, the survey also collected detailed infor-
mation about the respondents: income, job
security, race, gender, party identification, ideol-
ogy, and much more. 
The upshot is that we can statistically test
whether the vast belief differences between econ-
omists and the public are just a byproduct of
economists’ privileged circumstances, a right-
wing orientation, or both. In other words, we
can use the data to run a thought experiment:
What would a person with average income, aver-
age job security, average party identification,
average ideology, average everything, think if he
had a PhD in economics? I call such a person a
member of the “enlightened public”—someone
who combines the circumstances of the layman
with the knowledge of the expert.22
If the critics of the economics profession
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were completely right—if the sole reasons for
economists’ unusual views were self-serving
and/or ideological bias—then the enlightened
public and the actual public would see eye-to-
eye. If the critics of the economics profession
were completely wrong—if self-serving and
ideological bias had nothing to do with econ-
omists’ unusual views—then the enlightened
public and economists would see eye-to-eye. 
The world turns out to be much closer to
the second extreme than the first. Self-serv-
ing bias accounts for less than 20 percent of
the belief gap between economists and lay-
men. Controlling for ideological bias actual-
ly seems to slightly increase the size of the
belief gap. How is this possible? Because con-
trary to popular belief, economists tend to be
moderate Democrats, not conservative Repub-
licans. Economists are unusually favorable
toward markets not because of their extreme
right-wing perspective, but despite their mildly
left-wing perspective.23
Shooting down the leading opponents of
the “economists right, public wrong” posi-
tion does not prove that it is true. But it sig-
nificantly increases the probability. Think of
it this way: common sense advises us to trust
the experts. Critics challenge the experts’
objectivity, and their complaints turn out to
be in error. The sensible response is to reaf-
firm the common sense position. Indeed,
after the strongest challengers fail, we should
become more confident that economists are
right and the public is wrong. 
There is no reason, then, to deny econo-
mists a normal level of deference in their field
of expertise. But the profession also deserves
an affirmative defense. Frankly, the strongest
reason to accept its reliability is to flip
through a basic economics text, then read the
SAEE questions for yourself. You may not be
fully convinced of economists’ wisdom. I,
too, doubt it on occasion. But it is hard to
avert your gaze from the public’s folly. Time
and again, it gravitates toward answers that
are positively silly.
If that is too subjective for you, an impres-
sive empirical regularity points in the same
direction: education makes people think like econo-
mists. Out of the SAEE’s 37 questions, there are
19 where economic training and education
move together and only two where they move
apart. It is not merely members of one inbred
discipline who diverge from mainstream opin-
ion. So do educated Americans in general,
with the degree of divergence rising with the
level of education. And the magnitude is sub-
stantial. Moving from the bottom of the edu-
cational ladder to the top has more than half
of the (enormous) effect of an econ PhD.24
This pattern is all the more compelling
because it has parallels in other fields. Take
political knowledge. Education substantially
improves performance on objective tests about
government structure, leaders, and current
events.25 Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic similarly
find that education makes members of the gen-
eral public “think more like toxicologists.”26
Perhaps education just increases exposure to
brainwashing. But it is more likely that educat-
ed people think more clearly and know more.
With the most fundamental doubts about
the economics profession out of the way, we
are now ready to proceed. Economists have
been complaining about laymen’s economic
misconceptions for centuries. What seems to
be the problem?
Anti-Market Bias
I first learned about farm price supports
in the produce section of the grocery store. I
was in kindergarten. My mother explained
that price supports seemed to make fruits and
vegetables more expensive, but assured me
that this conclusion was simplistic. If the
supports went away, so many farms would go
out of business that prices would soon be
higher than ever. If I had been more preco-
cious, I would have asked a few questions.
Were there price support programs for the
other groceries? Why not? As it happened,
though, I accepted what she told me, and felt
a lingering sense that price competition is
bad for buyer and seller alike. 
This was one of my first memorable
encounters with anti-market bias, a tendency
to underestimate the economic benefits of the market
mechanism.27 The public has severe doubts
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about how much it can count on profit-seek-
ing business to produce socially beneficial out-
comes. It focuses on the motives of business,
and neglects the discipline imposed by com-
petition. While economists admit that profit-
maximization plus market imperfections can
yield bad results, non-economists tend to view
successful greed as socially harmful per se.
Near the end of his life, Joseph Schumpeter
eloquently captured the essence of anti-mar-
ket bias:
Capitalism stands its trial before
judges who have the sentence of death
in their pockets. They are going to pass
it, whatever the defense they may hear;
the only success victorious defense can
possibly produce is a change in the
indictment.28
Arguably the greatest historian of eco-
nomic thought, Schumpeter elsewhere mat-
ter-of-factly speaks of “the ineradicable preju-
dice that every action intended to serve the
profit interest must be anti-social by this fact
alone.”29 Considering his encyclopedic
knowledge, this remark speaks volumes.
Anti-market bias is not a temporary, cultural-
ly specific aberration. It is a deeply rooted
pattern of human thinking which has frus-
trated economists for generations.
Liberal Democratic economists echo and
amplify Schumpeter’s theme. Charles
Schultze, head of President Carter’s Council
of Economic Advisers, proclaims that “har-
nessing the ‘base’ motive of material self-inter-
est to promote the common good is perhaps
the most important social invention mankind
has yet achieved.”30 But politicians and voters
fail to appreciate this invention. “The virtually
universal characteristic of [environmental]
policy . . . is to start from the conclusion that
regulation is the obvious answer; the pricing
alternative is never considered.”31
There are too many variations on anti-mar-
ket bias to list them all. Probably the most
common is to equate market payments with trans-
fers, ignoring their incentive properties. (A
“transfer,” in economic jargon, is a no-strings-
attached movement of wealth from one per-
son to another). All that matters, then, is how
much you empathize with the transfer’s recip-
ient compared to the transfer’s provider. To
take the classic case: People tend to see profits
as a gift to rich. So unless you perversely pity
the rich more than the poor, limiting profits
seems like common sense.
Economists across the ideological spec-
trum find it hard to respond to this outlook
with anything but derision. Profits are not a
handout, but a quid pro quo: “If you want to
get rich, then you have to do something peo-
ple will pay for.” Profits give incentives to
reduce production costs, move resources
from less-valued to more-valued industries,
and dream up new products. This is the cen-
tral lesson of The Wealth of Nations: the “invisi-
ble hand” quietly persuades selfish business-
men to serve the public good:
Every individual is continually exerting
himself to find out the most advanta-
geous employment for whatever capi-
tal he can command. It is his own
advantage, indeed, and not that of the
society, which he has in view. But the
study of his own advantage naturally,
or rather necessarily leads him to pre-
fer that employment which is most
advantageous to the society.32
For modern economists, these are tru-
isms, but they usually miss the deeper lesson.
If Adam Smith’s observations are only tru-
isms, why did he bother to write them? Why
do teachers of economics keep quoting and
re-quoting this passage? Because Smith’s thesis
was counterintuitive to his contemporaries, and
remains counterintuitive today. A truism for the
few is heresy for the many. Smith, being well
aware of this fact, tried to shock readers out
of their dogmatic slumber: “By pursuing his
own interest he frequently promotes that of
the society more effectually than when he
really intends to promote it. I have never
known much good done by those who affect-
ed to trade for the publick good.”33 Business
profit appears to be a transfer but benefits
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society; business philanthropy appears to
benefit society but is at best a transfer.
To get an idea of how counterintuitive
Smith’s thesis remains, we can turn to a telling
question from the SAEE. Respondents were
asked to evaluate various explanations for why
the economy is not “doing better than it is.”
One of the candidates was “business profits
are too high.” Figure 3 shows the results.
Economists scoff at the idea that excessive
profits are hurting the economy. The public,
in contrast, takes the problem seriously. And
while critics of the economics profession
might like to attribute the pattern to self-
serving bias, the results for the enlightened
public support a curt rejoinder. Anyone with a
Ph.D. in economics, rich or poor, left or right,
would basically tell you the same.
Part of the public’s error is quantitative. It
wildly overestimates the rate of profit enjoyed
by the typical business, with an average guess
near 50 percent.34 But the disagreement is deep-
er. Through the prism of anti-market bias, the
public perceives profit as a lump-sum transfer
to business. Economists, in contrast, recognize
it as the motor of progress as well as flexibility.
The second most prominent avatar of
anti-market bias is monopoly theories of price.
Economists obviously acknowledge that
monopolies exist. But the public habitually
makes “monopoly” a scapegoat for scarcity.
The idea that supply and demand usually
control prices is hard to accept. Even in
industries with many firms, noneconomists
treat prices as a function of their CEOs’ inten-
tions and conspiracies. Economists under-
stand, however, that collusion is a “prisoner’s
dilemma.” If an industry has more than a
handful of firms, industrywide conspiracies
are unlikely to succeed.
The SAEE has a nice question to illustrate
this point. Back in 1996, it asked, “Which do
you think is more responsible for the recent
increase in gasoline prices?” Respondents
chose between “the normal law of supply and
demand” and “oil companies trying to
increase their profits.” As Figure 4 shows,
where economists see prices governed by
market forces, the public sees monopoly or
collusion. The numbers for the enlightened
public confirm that economists do not dis-
sent just because they are too rich to worry
about how much it costs to fill their gas tank.
The real problem is not that economists
are out of touch, but that the public’s story
makes no sense. If gas prices rise because “oil
companies are trying to increase their prof-
its,” why do gas prices ever fall? Do oil com-
panies feel generous and decide to cut their
profits? Basic economics, in contrast, has an
elegant explanation: if the cost of inputs falls,
so does the profit-maximizing price.
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“Business profits are too high.”
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Collusion aside, the public’s implicit
model of price determination is that busi-
nesses are monopolists of variable altruism.
If a CEO feels greedy when he wakes up, he
raises his price—or puts low-quality merchan-
dise on the shelves. Nice guys charge fair
prices for good products; greedy scoundrels
gouge with impunity for junk. It is only a
short step for market skeptics to add “and
nice guys finish last.” As John Mueller
emphasizes, the public links greed with
almost everything bad: capitalism is “com-
monly maligned for the deceit, unfairness,
dishonesty, and discourtesy that are widely
taken to be the inevitable consequences of its
apparent celebration of greed.”35
Where does the public go wrong? For one
thing, asking for more can get you less. Giving
your boss the ultimatum “double my pay or I
quit” usually ends badly. The same holds in
business: raising price and cutting quality
often lead to lower profits, not higher.
Mueller makes the deeper point that many
strategies that work as a one-shot scam back-
fire as routine policies. It is hard to make a
profit if no one sets foot in your store twice.
Intelligent greed militates against “deceit,
unfairness, dishonesty, and discourtesy”
because they damage the seller’s reputation. 
An outsider who eavesdrops on econo-
mists’ discussions might get the impression
that the benefits of markets remain controver-
sial. To understand their conversation, you
have to notice what economists are not debat-
ing. They are not debating whether prices give
incentives, or if a vast business conspiracy runs
the world. Almost all economists recognize
the core benefits of the market mechanism;
they disagree only at the margin.
Anti-Foreign Bias
A shrewd businessman I know has long
thought that everything wrong in the
American economy could be solved with two
expedients:
1. A naval blockade of Japan.
2. A Berlin Wall at the Mexican border.
This is only a mild caricature of his posi-
tion, which is all the more puzzling because he
usually gets the mutual benefits of trade. He
does well on eBay. But like most nonecono-
mists, he suffers from anti-foreign bias, a ten-
dency to underestimate the economic benefits of
interaction with foreigners.36 When outsiders
emerge on the economic scene, they do a men-
tal double take: “Foreigners? Could it really be
mutually beneficial for us to trade with them?”
Popular metaphors equate foreign trade
with racing and warfare, so you might say that
anti-foreign views are embedded in our lan-
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“Which do you think is more responsible for the recent increase in gasoline prices?”
0=“oil companies trying to increase their profits” 1=“the normal law of
supply and demand”
guage. Perhaps foreigners are sneakier, craftier,
or greedier. Whatever the reason, they suppos-
edly have a special power to exploit us. As the
19th century mathematician and economist
Simon Newcomb explained:
It has been assumed as an axiom which
needs no proof, because none would be
so hardy as to deny it, that foreign nations
cannot honestly be in favor of any trade
with us that is not to our disadvantage;
that the very fact that they want to trade
with us is a good reason for receiving their
overtures with suspicion and obstructing
their wishes by restrictive legislation.37
Alan Blinder echoes Newcomb’s lament a
century later. People around the world scape-
goat foreigners:
When jobs are scarce, the instinct for
self-preservation is strong, and the
temptation to blame foreign competi-
tors is all but irresistible. It was not
only in the United States that the
bunker mentality took hold. That
most economists branded the effort to
save jobs by protectionism shortsight-
ed and self-defeating was beside the
point. Legislators are out to win votes,
not intellectual kudos.38
The SAEE amply confirms Blinder’s
point. Respondents rated the severity of the
economic harm caused by the fact that “com-
panies are sending jobs overseas.” Figure 5
shows the results.
Economists are especially critical of the
anti-foreign outlook because it does not just
happen to be wrong; it conflicts with elemen-
tary economics. Textbooks teach that total
output increases if producers specialize and
trade. On an individual level, who could deny
it? Imagine how much time it would take to
grow your own food, when a few hours’ wages
spent at the grocery store feed you for weeks.
Analogies between individual and social
behavior are at times misleading, but this is
not one of those times. International trade is,
as Steven Landsburg explains, a technology:
There are two technologies for produc-
ing automobiles in America. One is to
manufacture them in Detroit, and the
other is to grow them in Iowa.
Everybody knows about the first tech-
nology; let me tell you about the second.
First you plant seeds, which are the raw
materials from which automobiles are
constructed. You wait a few months
until wheat appears. Then you harvest
the wheat, load it onto ships, and sail
the ships westward into the Pacific
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Ocean. After a few months, the ships
reappear with Toyotas on them.39
And this is one amazing technology. The
law of comparative advantage, one of the
most fascinating theorems in economics,
shows that mutually beneficial international
trade is possible even if one nation is less pro-
ductive in every way.40 Suppose an American
can make 10 cars or 5 bushels of wheat, and
a Mexican can make 1 car or 2 bushels of
wheat. Though the Americans are better at
both tasks, specialization and trade increase
production. If one American switches from
wheat to cars, and three Mexicans switch
from cars to wheat, world output goes up by
two cars plus one bushel of wheat. 
How can anyone overlook trade’s remark-
able benefits? Adam Smith, along with many
18th- and 19th-century economists, identifies
the root error as misidentification of money
and wealth: “A rich country, in the same man-
ner as a rich man, is supposed to be a country
abounding in money; and to heap up gold and
silver in any country is supposed to be the best
way to enrich it.”41 It follows that trade is zero-
sum, since the only way for a country to make
its balance more favorable is to make another
country’s balance less favorable. 
Even in Smith’s day, however, his story was
probably too clever by half. The root error behind
18th-century mercantilism was an unreasonable
distrust of foreigners. Otherwise, why would
people focus on money draining out of “the
nation,” but not “the region,” “the city,” “the vil-
lage,” or “the family”? In practice, human beings
then and now commit the balance of trade falla-
cy only when other countries enter the picture. No
one loses sleep about the trade balance between
California and Nevada, or me and my grocer.
The fallacy is not treating all purchases as a cost,
but treating foreign purchases as a cost.
Modern conditions do make anti-foreign
bias easier to spot. To take one prominent
example, immigration is far more of an issue
now than it was in Smith’s time. In theory,
trade in labor is roughly the same as trade in
goods. Specialization and exchange raise out-
put—for instance, by letting skilled American
moms return to work by hiring Mexican nan-
nies. The SAEE confirms that the public is
quick to see great dangers in this process—
and economists and the enlightened public
to minimize them (see Figure 6).
In terms of the balance of payments, immi-
gration is a nonissue. If an immigrant moves
from Mexico City to New York and spends all
his earnings in his new homeland, the balance
of trade does not change. Yet the public still
looks on immigration as a bald misfortune:
jobs lost, wages reduced, public services con-
sumed. Many see a larger trade deficit as a fair
price to pay for reduced immigration. One
peculiar pro-NAFTA argument is that if we
admit more Mexican goods, we will have fewer
Mexicans.42 It should be evident, then, that the
general public sees immigration as a distinct
danger—independent of, and more frighten-
ing than, an unfavorable balance of trade.
People feel all the more vulnerable when they
reflect that these foreigners are not just selling
us their products. They live among us.
Calm reflection on the international
economy reveals much to be thankful for,
and little to fear. On this point, economists
past and present agree. But an important
proviso lurks beneath the surface. Yes, there
is little to fear about the international econo-
my itself. But modern researchers—unlike
economists of the past and teachers of the
present—rarely mention that attitudes about
the international economy are another story.
Paul Krugman hits the nail on the head: “The
conflict among nations that so many policy
intellectuals imagine prevails is an illusion;
but it is an illusion that can destroy the reali-
ty of mutual gains from trade.”43
Make-Work Bias
I was an undergraduate when the Cold
War ended, and I can still remember talking
about military spending cuts with a conserva-
tive student. The whole idea made her ner-
vous. Why? Because she had no idea how a
market economy would absorb the dis-
charged soldiers. She did not even distinguish
between short-term and long-term conse-
quences of the cuts; in her mind, to lay off
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100,000 government employees was virtually
equivalent to disemploying 100,000 people
for life. Her position is particularly striking if
you realize that her objection would apply
equally to spending on government programs
that—as a conservative—she opposed.
If a well-educated individual ideologically
opposed to wasteful government spending
thinks like this, it is hardly surprising that she
is not alone. The public often literally believes
that labor is better to use than conserve.
Saving labor, producing more goods with
fewer man-hours, is widely perceived not as
progress, but as a danger. I call this make-
work bias, a tendency to underestimate the eco-
nomic benefits of conserving labor.44 Where non-
economists see the destruction of jobs, econ-
omists see the essence of economic growth—
the production of more with less. Alan
Blinder explains:
If you put the question directly, “Is high-
er productivity better than lower produc-
tivity?” few people will answer in the neg-
ative. Yet policy changes are often sold as
ways to “create jobs.” . . . Jobs can be cre-
ated in two ways. The socially beneficial
way is to enlarge GNP, so that there will
be more useful work to be done. But we
can also create jobs by seeing to it that
each worker is less productive. Then
more labor will be required to produce
the same bill of goods. The latter form of
job creation does raise employment; but
it is the path to rags, not riches.45
For an individual to prosper, he only
needs to have a job. But society can prosper
only if individuals do a job, if they create
goods and services that someone else wants.
Economists have been at war with the make-
work bias for centuries. Bastiat ridicules the
equation of prosperity with jobs as “Sisyphism,”
after the mythological fully employed Greek
who was eternally condemned to roll a boulder
up a hill. In the eyes of the public:
Effort itself constitutes and measures
wealth. To progress is to increase the
ratio of effort to result. Its ideal may be
represented by the toil of Sisyphus, at
once barren and eternal.46
In contrast, for the economist:
[W]ealth . . . increases proportionately
to the increase in the ratio of result to
effort. Absolute perfection, whose
archetype is God, consists in the widest
possible distance between these two
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terms, that is, a situation in which no
effort at all yields infinite results.47
The crudest form of make-work bias is
Luddite fear of the machine. Common sense
proclaims that machines make life easier for
human beings. The public qualifies this “naive”
position by noting that machines also make
people’s lives harder by throwing them out of
work. Economists, in contrast, doubt that the
pro-technology position needs to be qualified.
Technology often creates new jobs; without the
computer, there would be no jobs in computer
programming or software development. But
the fundamental defense of labor-saving tech-
nology is that employing more workers than
you need wastes valuable labor. 
Thus, when the SAEE asks respondents to
evaluate the economic effects of “increased
use of technology in the workplace,” both
laymen and experts lean in a favorable direc-
tion. But economists are virtually unani-
mous, and the public clearly has reservations
inspired by make-work bias (see Figure 7).
Economists often observe that if you pay a
worker to twiddle his thumbs, you could have
paid him to do something socially useful
instead. Their deeper point, though, is that mar-
ket forces readily convert this potential social ben-
efit into an actual one. After technology throws
people out of work, they have an incentive to
find a new use for their talents. Michael Cox and
Richard Alm aptly describe this process as
“churn”: “Through relentless turmoil, the econ-
omy re-creates itself, shifting labor resources to
where they’re needed, replacing old jobs with
new ones.”48 They illustrate this process with
history’s most striking example: the drastic
decline in agricultural employment:
In 1800, it took nearly 95 of every 100
Americans to feed the country. In 1900,
it took 40. Today, it takes just 3. . . . The
workers no longer needed on farms
have been put to use providing new
homes, furniture, clothing, computers,
pharmaceuticals, appliances, medical
assistance, movies, financial advice,
video games, gourmet meals, and an
almost dizzying array of other goods
and services. . . . What we have in place
of long hours in the fields is the wealth
of goods and services that comes from
allowing the churn to work, wherever
and whenever it might occur.49
Exasperating as the Luddite mentality is,
countries rarely move beyond rhetoric and turn
back the clock of technology. But you cannot
say the same about another controversy infused
with make-work bias: hostility to downsizing.
What could possibly be good about downsizing?
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Every time we figure out how to accomplish a
goal using fewer workers, it enriches society,
because labor is a valuable resource.
We have a tremendous stake in allow-
ing the churn to grind forward,
putting our labor resources to work
raising living standards, to give us
more for less. We can’t get around it:
The churn’s promise of higher living
standards can’t be reaped without job
losses. . . . Downsizing companies will
be vilified for making what appear to
be hardhearted decisions. When pas-
sions cool, however, there ought to be
time to recognize that, in most cases,
the dirty work had to be done.50
See how this issue plays out in the SAEE
(see Figure 8). Respondents were asked to
assess the economic harm resulting from the
fact that “companies are downsizing.”
The popular stance rests on the illusion
that employment, not production, is the mea-
sure of prosperity. In contrast, for economists
and the enlightened public, downsizing
proves the rule that private greed and the
public interest point in the same direction.
Downsizing superfluous workers leads them
to search for more socially productive ways to
apply their abilities. Imagine what would have
happened if the farms of the 19th century
never “downsized.” Greed drove these
changes, but they remained changes for the
better.
Pessimistic Bias
I first encountered anti-drug propaganda
in the second grade. It was called “drug educa-
tion,” but it was mostly scary stories. I was told
that kids around me were using drugs, and
that a pusher would soon offer me some, too.
Teachers warned that more and more kids
would become addicts, and by the time I was
in junior high I would be surrounded by them.
Authority figures would occasionally specu-
late about our adulthood, and wonder how a
country could function with such a degener-
ate workforce. Yet another reason, they mused,
that this country is going downhill.
The junior high dystopia never material-
ized. I am still waiting to be offered drugs. By
the time I reached adulthood, it was apparent
that most people were not going to their jobs
high on PCP. Generation X used its share of
illegal narcotics, but its entry into the work-
force accompanied the marvels of the
Internet age, not a stupor-induced decline in
productivity and innovation.
My teachers’ predictions about America’s
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economic future turned out to be laughable.
But they fit nicely into a larger pattern. As a
general rule, the public believes economic
conditions are not as good as they really are.
It sees a world going from bad to worse; the
economy faces a long list of grim challenges,
leaving little room for hope. I refer to the
public’s leanings as pessimistic bias, a ten-
dency to overestimate the severity of economic prob-
lems and underestimate the (recent) past, present,
and future performance of the economy.51
Suppose a congenitally pessimistic doctor
examines a patient. There are two kinds of
errors to watch out for. For one thing, he
would exaggerate the severity of the patient’s
symptoms. After finding a body temperature
of 100 degrees, the doctor might exclaim that
the patient has a “dangerous fever.” But the
doctor might also err in his overall judgment,
giving the patient two weeks to live. 
Pessimism about the economy exhibits the
same characteristics. You may be pessimistic
about symptoms, overblowing the severity of
everything from the deficit to affirmative action.
But you can also be pessimistic overall, seeing
negative trends in living standards, wages, and
inequality. Public opinion is marked by pes-
simism in both forms. Economists constantly
advise the public not to lose sleep over the latest
economic threat in the news. But they also make
a habit of explaining how far mankind has come
in the last hundred years, pointing out massive
gains we take for granted.52
Adam Smith famously ridiculed pes-
simism with a one-liner: “There is a great deal
of ruin in a nation.”53 His point, which econ-
omists often echo, is that the public lacks
perspective. A large economy can and usually
does progress despite interminable setbacks.
While economists debate about how much
growth to expect, public discourse is framed
in terms of stagnation versus decline. 
Consider expectations about the living stan-
dard of the next generation. The SAEE asks
respondents: “Do you expect your children’s
generation to enjoy a higher or lower standard
of living than your generation, or do you think
it will be about the same?” (see Figure 9). On
average, the public expects stagnation, econo-
mists are more optimistic, and the enlightened
public is most optimistic of all. 
How can the enlightened public be more
extreme than actual economists? The answer
is that high-income males are actually
unusually pessimistic about the future of
prosperity. Since economists tend to be high-
income males, their demographics dilute
their optimism. 
A staple of pessimistic rhetoric is to idealize
conditions in the more distant past in order to
put recent conditions in a negative light.
Arthur Herman’s The Idea of Decline in Western
History asserts that “virtually every culture past
or present has believed that men and women
are not up to the standards of their parents
and forebears” and asks “why is this sense of
decline common to all cultures?”54
Pessimistic bias is less well known than anti-
market, anti-foreign, or make-work bias.
Famous economists of the past frequently over-
looked it; teachers of economics spend relatively
little time rooting it out. But although the voice
of oral tradition is softer than usual, it is not
silent. Though he did not live to see the full
fruits of the Industrial Revolution, Adam Smith
declared progress to be the normal course of
events:
The uniform, constant, and uninter-
rupted effort of every man to better his
condition . . . is frequently powerful
enough to maintain the natural progress of
things toward improvement, in spite both of
the extravagance of government, and of
the greatest errors of administration.
Like the unknown principle of animal
life, it frequently restores health and
vigour to the constitution, in spite, not
only of the disease, but of the absurd
prescriptions of the doctor.55
However, progress is so gradual that a few
pockets of decay hide it from the public view: 
To form a right judgment of it, indeed,
we must compare the state of the coun-
try at periods somewhat distant from
one another. The progress is frequently
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tain branches of industry, or of certain
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sometimes happen though the country
in general be in great prosperity, there
frequently arises a suspicion that the riches
and industry of the whole are decaying.56
David Hume—economist, philosopher,
and Adam Smith’s best friend—blames popu-
lar pessimism on our psychology, not the
slow and uneven nature of progress: “The
humour of blaming the present, and admir-
ing the past, is strongly rooted in human
nature, and has an influence even on persons
endued with the profoundest judgment and
most extensive learning.”57
Despite those promising beginnings, 19th-
century economists did little to develop the
theme of pessimistic bias. Bastiat and Newcomb
say little about it. In recent decades, however,
economists have been making up for lost time.
Cox and Alm appeal to fundamental human
psychology to explain our pessimism: “The pre-
sent almost always pales when measured against
‘the good old days.’”58 Mild forms of this bias
sustain lingering economic malcontent:
“Nostalgists often ignore improvements in
goods and services, yet remember fondly the
prices they paid long ago for the cheapest ver-
sions of products.”59 Strong forms make us
“open-minded” to paranoid fantasies: 
Some part of human nature connects
with the apocalyptic. Time and again,
the pessimists among us have envisioned
the world going straight to hell. Never
mind that it hasn’t: A lot of us braced for
the worst. Whether the source is the Bible
or Nostradamus, Thomas Malthus, or
the Club of Rome, predictions of calami-
ties yet to come aren’t easily ignored, no
matter how many times we wake up the
morning after the world was supposed to
end.60
How can high levels of pessimism coexist
with constantly rising standards of living? It is
arguable that the gap between objective condi-
tions and subjective perceptions is now greater
than ever.61 The SAEE finds, for example, that
the public is overwhelmingly convinced that
new jobs are low-paying, while economists
and the enlightened public take a roughly bal-
anced position (see Figure 10).
In part, economists simply think that the
numbers contradict the public’s extreme pes-
simism.62 But the belief gap runs deeper than
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the latest data set. The progress of recent cen-
turies implies that it is abnormal for new jobs to
be low paying. A temporary setback is possible,
but it merits an intellectual double-take.
There is an ongoing debate about the slow-
down of growth. This is what relatively pes-
simistic economists like Paul Krugman mean
when they say that “the U.S. economy is
doing badly.”63 Other economists counter
that standard numbers inadequately adjust
for the rising quality and variety of the con-
sumption basket and the changing composi-
tion of the workforce. The rapid growth of
the ’90s raised more doubts. Either way, the
worst-case scenario GDP statistics permit—a
lower speed of progress—is no disaster. In the
face of popular economic pessimism,
Krugman, too, exclaims: “I have seen the pre-
sent, and it works!”64
Rethinking Systematic
Error
Economists have a love-hate relationship
with systematic bias. As theorists, they deny its
existence. As empiricists, they increasingly
import it from other fields. But when they
teach, address the public, or wonder what is
wrong with the world, they dip into their own
“private stash.” On some level, economists not
only recognize that systematically biased
beliefs exist. They think they have discovered
virulent strains in their own backyard—sys-
tematically biased beliefs about economics.
Anti-market bias, anti-foreign bias, make-
work bias, and pessimistic bias are the most
prominent specimens. Indeed, they are so
prominent that one can hardly teach econom-
ics without bumping into them. Students of
economics are not a blank slate for their teach-
ers to write on. They arrive with strong preju-
dices. They underestimate the benefits of mar-
kets. They underestimate the benefits of dealing
with foreigners. They underestimate the bene-
fits of conserving labor. They underestimate
the performance of the economy and overesti-
mate its problems.
The SAEE is hardly the only empirical evi-
dence for these propositions. There are
numerous studies of economic beliefs.65 The
advantage of the SAEE is its craftsmanship. It
has been constructed to deflect the main
objections that skeptics could levy against ear-
lier empirics. Now that the SAEE has cleared
these hurdles, it is fair to look back and recog-
nize that the earlier literature—including both
statistical work and economists’ centuries of
observation and reflection—is basically sound.
The upshot is that economists’ reliance on
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the miracle of aggregation is deeply misguid-
ed. Indeed, this blind spot is particularly hard
to excuse because they stand at the end of a
long tradition with a lot to say about bias.
Many of the most famous economists of the
past, like Adam Smith and Frédéric Bastiat,
obsessed over the public’s wrong-headed
beliefs about economics, its stubborn resis-
tance to basic principles like opportunity cost
and comparative advantage. Today’s econo-
mists have not merely failed to follow relevant
empirical work in a related discipline. They
have also turned their backs on what econo-
mists used to know.
At least this is what economists have done
as researchers. As teachers, curiously, most
economists honor the wisdom of their fore-
bears. Paul Samuelson famously remarked, “I
don’t care who writes a nation’s laws—or
crafts its advanced treaties—if I can write its
economics textbooks.”66 This assumes, as
teachers of economics usually do, that stu-
dents arrive with systematic errors. 
This peculiar disconnect between research
and teaching has an important upside. The
problem is not that economists have nothing
to say about bias. On the contrary, the prob-
lem is that economists have a lot to say but
are reluctant to go public, to put their scien-
tific credibility on the line. If this reluctance
could be overcome, however, the oral tradi-
tion of the teachers of economics offers the
researchers of economics a rich mine of sci-
entific hypotheses. 
At the same time, however, the oral tradi-
tion has been subject to so little analytical
scrutiny that it is not hard to refine.
Samuelson’s is a story of hope; we can sleep
soundly as long as he keeps writing textbooks.
But pondering two more facts might keep us
lying awake at night. Fact one: The economics
the average introductory student absorbs is
disappointingly small. If students had severe
biases at the beginning, most still have large
biases at the end. Fact two: below-average stu-
dents are above-average citizens. Most voters never
take a single course in economics. If it is dis-
turbing to imagine the bottom half of the
class voting on economic policy, it is frighten-
ing to realize that the general population
already does. The typical voter, to whose opin-
ions politicians cater, is probably unable to
earn a passing grade in basic economics. No
wonder protectionism, price controls, and
other foolish policies so often prevail.
“Market Fundamentalism”
versus the Religion of
Democracy
Economists perennially debate each other
about how well the free market works. They
have to step outside their profession to
remember how much—underneath it all—they
agree. For economists, greedy intentions
establish no presumption of social harm.
Indeed, their rule of thumb is to figure out
who could get rich by solving a problem—and
start worrying if no one comes to mind. Most
noneconomists find this whole approach dis-
tasteful, even offensive. Disputes between
economists are quibbles by comparison. 
Out of all of their contrarian views, noth-
ing about economists aggravates other intel-
lectuals more than their sympathy for mar-
kets. As Melvin Reder aptly states, compre-
hension of mainstream economics “tends to
generate appreciation of the merits of laissez-
faire even when that appreciation does not
extend to acceptance.”67 Left to their own
devices, “normal” intellectuals could spend
their careers cataloging human greed and the
evils that flow from it. But economists stand
in their midst, a fifth column, using their
mental gifts to defend the enemy. 
“Market fundamentalism” is probably the
most popular insult against economics these
days. The world listened when billionaire
George Soros declared that “market funda-
mentalism . . . has rendered the global capital-
ist system unsound and unsustainable.”68
Robert Kuttner has a handy summary of what
market fundamentalism amounts to: 
There is at the core of the celebration
of markets a relentless tautology. If we
begin, by assumption, with the premise
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that nearly everything can be under-
stood as a market and that markets
optimize outcomes, then everything
comes back to the same conclusion—
marketize! If, in the event, a particular
market doesn’t optimize, there is only
one possible inference: it must be
insufficiently marketlike.69
He insists, moreover, that this fault is not
limited to a right-wing fringe: “Today, the
only difference between the utopian version
and the mainstream version is degree.”70
Indeed, “as economics has become more fun-
damentalist, the most extreme version of the mar-
ket model has carried the greatest political, intellec-
tual, and professional weight.”71 Even worse,
economists’ fundamentalism overflows into
the policy arena:
American liberals and European social
democrats often seem unable to offer
more than a milder version of the con-
servative program—deregulation, pri-
vatization, globalization, fiscal disci-
pline, but at a less zealous extreme. Few
have been willing to challenge the premise
that nearly everything should revert to a
market.72
Joseph Stiglitz joins the chorus against
market fundamentalism, happily discarding
the guarded professorial prose of his Nobel
prize-winning research: 
The discontent with globalization arises
not just from economics seeming to be
pushed over everything else, but because
a particular view of economics—market
fundamentalism—is pushed over all
other views. Opposition to globalization
in many parts of the world is not to glob-
alization per se . . . but to the particular
set of doctrines, the Washington
Consensus policies that the internation-
al financial instituions have imposed.73
Market fundamentalism is a harsh accu-
sation. Christian fundamentalists are notori-
ous for their strict Biblical literalism, their
unlimited willingness to ignore or twist the
facts of geology and biology to match their
prejudices. For the analogy to be apt, the typ-
ical economist would have to believe in the
superiority of markets virtually without
exception, regardless of the evidence, and dis-
senters would have to fear excommunication.
From this standpoint, the charge of “mar-
ket fundamentalism” is silly, failing even as a
caricature. If you ask the typical economist to
name areas where markets work poorly, he
gives you a list on the spot: Public goods, exter-
nalities, monopoly, imperfect information,
and so on. More importantly, almost every-
thing on the list can be traced back to other
economists. Market failure is not a concept
that has been forced upon a reluctant eco-
nomics profession from the outside. It is an
internal outgrowth of economists’ self-criti-
cism. After stating that markets usually work
well, economists feel an urge to think up
counterexamples. Far from facing excommu-
nication for sin against the sanctity of the
market, discoverers of novel market failures
reap professional rewards. Flip through the
leading journals. A high fraction of their arti-
cles present theoretical or empirical evidence
of market failure.
True market fundamentalists in the eco-
nomics profession are few and far between.
Not only are they absent from the center of
the profession; they are rare at the “right-
wing” extreme. Milton Friedman, a legendary
libertarian, made numerous exceptions, on
everything from money to welfare to
antitrust:
Our principles offer no hard and fast
line how far it is appropriate to use gov-
ernment to accomplish jointly what is
difficult or impossible for us to accom-
plish separately through strictly volun-
tary exchange. In any particular case of
proposed intervention, we must make
up a balance sheet, listing separately the
advantages and disadvantages.74
When Friedman preferred laissez-faire, he
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often openly acknowledged its defects. He had
no quasi-religious need to defend the impec-
cability of the free market. For example, his
discussion of natural monopoly stated:
There are only three alternatives that
seem available: private monopoly, pub-
lic monopoly, or public regulation. All
three are bad so we must choose
among evils. . . . I reluctantly conclude
that, if tolerable, private monopoly
may be the least of the evils.75
Friedman was far more market-friendly
than the average economist. But a “market
fundamentalist”? Hardly. He recognized
numerous cases where market performance
is poor, and he did not excommunicate less
pro-market colleagues for heresy.
Popular accusations of market funda-
mentalism are plain wrong. Yes, economists
think that the market works better than
other people do. But they acknowledge
exceptions to the rule. The range of these
exceptions changes as new evidence comes in.
And it is usually economists themselves who
discover the exceptions in the first place.
Democratic
Fundamentalism
The disparity between economists’ open-
mindedness and the charge of market funda-
mentalism is so vast that it is hard not to
speculate about the motives behind it. I sense
a strong element of projection: accusing oth-
ers of the cognitive misdeeds one commits
oneself. Take, for example, “creation scien-
tists.” Faculty and researchers of the Institute
for Creation Research follow a party line:
“The scriptures, both Old and New
Testaments, are inerrant in relation to any
subject with which they deal, and are to be
accepted in their normal and intended
sense.”76 You can hardly get less scientific. Yet
a standard debating tactic of creation scien-
tists is to insist that “evolutionary theory,
along with its bedfellow, secular humanism,
is really a religion.”77 Creationists’ attacks on
the objectivity of mainstream evolutionists
seem to stem from their sense of scientific
inferiority to their opponents.
Similarly, the most vocal opponents of
“market fundamentalism” are themselves
often believers in what can accurately be
called “democratic fundamentalism.” Its
purest expression is the cliche, attributed to
failed 1928 presidential candidate Al Smith,
that “all the ills of democracy can be cured by
more democracy.”78 In other words, no matter
what happens, the case for democracy remains
untouched.
A person who said “All the ills of markets
can be cured by more markets” would be lam-
pooned as the worst sort of market funda-
mentalist. Why the double standard? Because
unlike market fundamentalism, democratic
fundamentalism is widespread. In polite com-
pany, you can make fun of the worshippers of
Zeus, but not Christians or Jews. Similarly, it is
socially acceptable to make fun of market fun-
damentalism, but not democratic fundamen-
talism, because market fundamentalists are
scarce, and democratic fundamentalists are all
around us. 
In the end, apologists for democracy often
fall back on Winston Churchill’s slogan that
“democracy is the worst form of government,
except all those other forms that have been
tried from time to time.”79 On the surface,
this sounds like mature realism, not democ-
ratic fundamentalism. But Churchill’s
maxim is an all-or-nothing rhetorical trick.
Imagine if an economist dismissed com-
plaints about the free market by snapping:
“The free market is the worst form of eco-
nomic organization, except all the others.”
This is a fine objection to communism, but
only a market fundamentalist would buy it
as an argument against moderate govern-
ment intervention. Churchill’s slogan is every
bit as weak. Just because dictatorship is dis-
astrous, it hardly follows that democracy
must have free rein. Like markets, democracy
can be limited, regulated, or overruled.
Contramajoritarian procedures like judicial
review can operate alongside democratic
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ones. Supermajority rules allow minorities to
thwart the will of the majority. Twisting a
marginal tradeoff into a binary choice is fun-
damentalism trying to sound reasonable.
Private Choice as an
Alternative to Democracy
and Dictatorship
Undemocratic politics is not the only
alternative to democratic politics. Many areas
of life stand outside the realm of politics, of
“collective choice.” When the law is silent,
decisions are “up to the individual” or “left to
the market.” If the term were not preempted,
private choice could be called “the Third
Way,” the alternative to both democracy and
dictatorship. 
For most of human history, religion was a
state responsibility. The idea that govern-
ment could have no established religion was
inconceivable. All that has changed; now
individuals decide which religion, if any, to
practice. Verbal gymnastics notwithstanding,
this depoliticization is undemocratic. The
majority now has as little say about my reli-
gion as it would under a dictatorship; in both
cases, the law ignores public opinion. Before
the 1930s, similarly, many areas of U.S. eco-
nomic life were undemocratically shielded
from federal and state regulation.80 The mar-
ket periodically trumped democracy, on
everything from the minimum wage to the
National Recovery Administration. And
unless you are a democratic fundamentalist,
you have to be open to the possibility that
this was all for the good. 
Fervent partisans of democracy often
grant that democracy and the market are
substitutes. As Kuttner puts it, “The democ-
ratic state remains the prime counterweight
to the market.”81 Their complaint is that the
public has less and less say over its destiny
because corporations have more and more
say over theirs. To “save democracy,” the peo-
ple must reassert its authority. 
Fair enough. Though their opponents
greatly overstate the extent of privatization
and deregulation, these policies take deci-
sions out of the hands of majorities and into
the hands of business owners. But the critics
rarely wonder if this transfer might be desir-
able. They treat less reliance on democracy as
automatically objectionable.
That is another symptom of democratic
fundamentalism. If all that an economist
had to say against a government program
were, “That’s government intervention.
Government is supplanting markets!” he
would be pigeonholed, then marginalized, as
a market fundamentalist. But when an equal-
ly simplistic cry goes up in the name of
democracy, there is a sympathetic audience.
It is logically possible that clear-eyed business
greed makes better decisions than confused
voter altruism. Why not at least compare
their performance, instead of prejudging? 
The complaint that we are “losing democ-
racy” is especially weak when we bear in mind
that this is not a binary choice between
unlimited democracy and pure laissez-faire.
Just because some democracy is beneficial or
necessary, it scarcely follows that we should
not have less. Consider deregulation of the
television and radio spectrum. Democratic
fundamentalists find the idea offensive
because it ends democratic oversight.82 But it
is hard to see the value of democracy in the
entertainment industry. Premium networks
like HBO demonstrate that the profit
motive, uninhibited by majority preferences,
is a recipe for high-quality, creative program-
ming. Democratic fundamentalism holds
back the rest of the industry.
While my analysis here has debunked the
main efforts to undermine the objectivity of
the economics profession, it adds little to the
debate on the virtues of markets. Rather, I
have tried to put weight on the other side of
the scale. The optimal mix between markets
and government depends not on the
absolute virtues of markets, but on their
virtues compared to those of government. No
matter how well you think markets work, it
makes sense to rely on markets more when
you grow more pessimistic about democracy.
If you use two car mechanics and discover
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that mechanic A drinks on the job, the nat-
ural response is to shift some of your busi-
ness over to mechanic B, whatever your pre-
existing complaints about B.
The striking implication is that even econ-
omists, widely charged with market funda-
mentalism, should be more pro-market than
they already are. What economists currently
see as the optimal balance between markets
and government rests upon an overestimate of
the virtues of democracy. In many cases, econo-
mists should embrace the free market in spite
of its defects, because it still outshines the
democratic alternative.
Even among economists, market-oriented
policy prescriptions are often seen as too dog-
matic, too unwilling to take the flaws of the
free market into account. Many prefer a more
“sophisticated” position: Since we have
already belabored the advantages of markets,
let us not forget to emphasize the benefits of
government intervention. I claim that the
qualification needs qualification: Before we
emphasize the benefits of government inter-
vention, let us distinguish intervention
designed by a well-intentioned economist
from intervention that appeals to nonecono-
mists, and reflect that the latter predominate.
You do not have to be dogmatic to take a
staunchly pro-market position. You just have
to notice that the “sophisticated” emphasis
on the benefits of intervention mistakes theo-
retical possibility for empirical likelihood.
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